

Organisation of Urban Communities for Devolution in Zimbabwe.

NYASHA NDEMO AND RUMBIDZAI MPAHLO¹

Abstract

With Section 264 of the Constitution, Zimbabwe has included the new phenomenon of devolution in the running affairs of urban communities. This is a result of the desire for participatory governance to disperse power. The local government system in Zimbabwe has a troubled history that has inhibited citizens from participating in public affairs because it has been fashioned through time by several laws that have not fostered an environment that encourages citizen involvement. An analysis of Section 264 of the Zimbabwean Constitution shows that devolution tends to promote openness, efficiency, and effectiveness as well as the transfer of obligations from the central government to provincial and municipal levels. It is believed that the progress in local government accountability, effectiveness, and service delivery has been slowed down by the delayed implementation of devolution. This article's goal is to evaluate the Constitution's Section 264 provisions and how putting those into practice can improve municipal government.

Keywords: *Development, service delivery, funding, urban councils*

INTRODUCTION

States in Sub-Saharan Africa have constitutions that provide different levels of decentralisation for their political structures. African governments, international aid agencies, and civil society organisations embrace and see decentralisation favourably because they perceive it as a democratic style of administration that promotes citizen participation in human development (Bardhan, 2002). This agreement sees

¹ Department of Development Programming and Management, Zimbabwe Ezekiel Guti University, Bindura, Zimbabwe

decentralisation as an essential step toward local democratisation in Africa because it makes local governments more accountable and responsive. Although there are four main forms of decentralisation; administrative, political, fiscal, and market; many African nations have chosen to employ administrative and political decentralisation because they are seen as being more democratic (Barnett *et al.*, 2017). These are the democratic credentials that South Africa, which has a unique decentralisation model based on a three-layer cooperative government structure, as well as Kenya and Uganda, which have devolved administrations, are frequently cited for, and Zimbabwe just joined the group of African countries whose constitutions provide a decentralised form of administration (Bhebhe, 2013).

Governmental power must be devolved among the national government, provincial and metropolitan councils, and local authorities, as per Zimbabwe's new Constitution, which was adopted in May 2013. These entities are responsible for ensuring good governance by being effective, transparent, accountable, and responsive to community needs (Bhebhe, 2013). On the premise that it is a more democratic, citizen-centred, participatory, open, and accountable system with a development-focused approach, devolution of power is being implemented in Zimbabwe as a new form of government to replace deconcentration. The Zimbabwe Constitution Amendment (No. 20) Act 2013's Section 264 lays out the rationale for the devolution of governmental responsibilities and activities. Subsection 1 requires that "when appropriate, governmental activities and responsibilities must be assigned to provincial and metropolitan councils and local authorities" to carry out these commitments effectively and efficiently (Blowgun, 2020). As a result of the implementation of these constitutional provisions, new requirements for institutional capacities, skills, and competencies will surely be developed to promote transparency and accountability at the various levels of government.

The advantages and potential disadvantages of this transition from a two-tier to a three-tier decentralised form of governance are covered in this article (Bogdanor, 2018). It does so by providing answers to the following questions: How much would the State's transformation from centralisation to devolution boost the inhabitants' capacity to elect representatives who are aware and supportive of their local development

requirements (Bradbury, 2007)? Will local needs and ambitions influence and shape the development agenda instead of the current top-down deconcentrating model of development? What benefits, both consequentialist and deontological, would the devolution of authority entail? Will devolution have an impact on how fairly and equally local resources are used to benefit everyone, even those in "marginalised" provinces like Manicaland, the Midlands, and Matabeleland? (Bradbury, 2007). Is there sufficient political will in a Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) led administration to properly enact devolution? Or is it possible that the constitutional provision allowing for the devolution of authority would merely be symbolic, retaining the existing deconcentrating situation?

The objectives of the transfer of governmental authority and duties to provincial, metropolitan, and municipal authorities are to: Give the people more control over local governance and involve them more in using state power and making decisions that affect them; Promote democratic, effective, transparent, accountable, and cogent governance in Zimbabwe as a whole; Preserve and promote peace, national unity, and tolerance. Ensure that local and national resources are distributed fairly; Transfer responsibility and funding from the central government to give local governments more control over local and national resources (Bradbury, 2007).

The fundamental principles of provincial and municipal government in the context of devolution are also outlined in Section 265 of the Constitution as follows: Provincial, metropolitan, and municipal councils and authorities within their authority shall: Assume only those responsibilities given to them by this Constitution or a parliamentary act; ensuring good governance by being effective, responsible, transparent, and institutionally cogent; cooperate, particularly by informing one another of, and consulting one another on, matters of common interest; harmonise and coordinate their activities; preserving the peace, national unity, and indivisibility of Zimbabwe; securing because of this, formal legal systems typically fall short of recognising or directing the activities that urban local governments carry out, as well as of educating them about the ever-more-complex responsibilities that they are required to undertake (Bradbury,

2017). This is troublesome because it suggests that cities are regularly (inadvertently) prevented from responding to opportunities or problems in an effective manner by the law. It also implies that individuals who violate the law do not face consequences for their actions.

In member countries of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), this article analyses the connections between urban autonomy and the legal and constitutional responsibilities, functions, and authority of urban local government. SADC countries include Zimbabwe, Zambia, South Africa, Angola, Mozambique, Lesotho, Namibia, Malawi, Tanzania and Eswatini. Although cities in the region are governed by a variety of constitutional and legal systems, they are all hampered by rapid, unplanned, and uneven urbanisation, poverty, environmental degradation, inequality, overcrowding, underdevelopment, the lingering effects of spatial and socioeconomic colonialism, inadequate infrastructure, and a lack of governmental capacity (Chikulo, 2018). Like other cities in sub-Saharan Africa, they are limited by the legacy of colonialism, which includes an extractive, unbalanced economy, disconnected, fragmented, and inefficient urban form, low levels of employment, industrialisation, and economic participation, and a lack of economic agglomeration, operating primarily on the periphery of the global urban economy. As will be shown, political polarisation, party politics, a lack of human and financial resources, and dysfunctional institutions for accountability, intergovernmental cooperation, and community engagement have all hindered the devolution of state authority, making it uneven, partial, and problematic (Chikulo, 2018). The cities of the SADC, however, show urbanisation's full potential and act as the economic backbones of their various nation-states. They are therefore in a unique position to aid in achieving the goals of the New Urban Agenda (NUA).

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Even in the unitary European state, where the term "devolution" originated, there are several variations on it. Its very openness may make it appealing at a time when the state's function is evolving and power is moving outward to the market and civil society, downward to towns and regions, and upward to the European and global levels. Devolution has drawn two frequent criticisms. The first is that since it can always be

retrieved, the authority that has been delegated still belongs to the centre. But in reality, it is based on the political environment (Crawford, 2009). The second is that it is inherently centrifugal since various regions will always compete with one another for dominance. This is shown by the fact that the processes in Belgium and, to a lesser extent, Spain, have taken on a life of their own as opposed to being propelled by public opinion. On the other hand, the United Kingdom presents a very different picture, with the public acknowledging that different states' regions should have their own unique constitutional arrangements and English people rejecting devolution for their own territory. A more severe version of this critique, which asserts that devolution is a slippery slope to independence, is met with even less evidence. Devolving systems are always evolving; some could become stable federations in the future, while others become global, asymmetrical unions. Again, in other situations, devolution might not be successful, and governments might switch back to being centralised, as happened in Italy after the early regional reforms or twice in England (Friedman, 2019). Decentralisation inside companies or even local government has both been described using the word "devolution." Different parts of the world may experience similar dynamics. However, if the term is used too widely, there is a chance that it will be mistaken for the more comprehensive concept of decentralisation.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The need of paying attention to the formal features of urban autonomy and governance is demonstrated by the fact that municipal governments globally are increasingly acting autonomously in many domains, regardless of whether their actions are legally or constitutionally authorised. Although different local government forms utilised in constitutional systems across the world typically allow cities just a modest level of regulated autonomy, this seldom represents the entire breadth of autonomous urban local government activity (Government of Zambia, 2002). In several functional areas, cities in the United States are progressively asserting de facto power over government. They occasionally clash with "higher-level" governments, but more often than not, they just go about their everyday business in ways that are in opposition to, or at the very least, much beyond, their official functions. Local government is demanding more power internationally (as evidenced by the growing

influence of groups like United Cities and Local Government (UCLG) and the C40 Cities for Sustainability group), while collaboration between individual cities and collective cross-boundary urban policy initiatives is becoming more commonplace, although they are still not recognised by formal structures of international relations and international organisations. Many studies examining the relationship between the European Union (EU) and its regions have placed devolution at the centre of their investigations. It has been assumed in some studies that it both raises the amount of regional engagement and influence in Brussels and also strengthens its independence from central governments since it has been seen as both a driver and a facilitator of territorial mobilisation at the EU level (Harris, 2018). Devolution was also thought to increase conflict on the European stage since it was shown that conflict in domestic intergovernmental relations was positively connected with devolution. Recent research has emphasised that higher devolution levels are associated with less bypassing and more cooperation between the state and its regions in their European activities, challenging these two assumptions, which have been popular in much multilevel governance (MLG) research (greater independence in Brussels and greater conflict on the European scene) (Tatham, 2007, 2010). These findings, however first counterintuitive, only show that increased devolution results in greater regional engagement in the formulation of domestic EU policy.

A thorough analysis of the link between devolution and regional involvement in the development of domestic EU policy has never been conducted in the EU-27. This work offers a measure of institutionalised regional participation and examines its link to Hooghe *et al.* (2020)'s to close this research gap. We contend that such a connection is not only non-linear generally but also highly favourable. A quadratic understanding of the link between devolution and regional engagement is more realistic, according to a comparison of linear and non-linear models. According to the quadratic model, the link is non-existent below a particular degree of degeneration and overpowering above that point (Ingham & Kalam, 2019). A qualitative analysis of the causal relationship demonstrates that there are solid reasons to accept the theory that, above a certain threshold located above the population mean, greater devolution is associated with

increased institutionalised regional participation in the formulation of domestic EU policy.

The analysis provides some clarification for the seemingly contradictory findings of studies on state-region interaction in Brussels and internal intergovernmental ties. The projected rise in the conflict in Brussels has not materialised, although increasing devolution tends to exacerbate tensions in internal intergovernmental ties (Juma, 2003). Instead, more devolution has led to improved coordination and collaboration at the EU level (Tatham, 2010). This otherwise counterintuitive conclusion is explained by the generally favourable, albeit non-linear, link between devolution and organised regional participation in the internal EU policy-shaping process. Although the process (of domestic intergovernmental relations) may be conflict-ridden, the results at the EU level will be more coordinated and cooperative than when devolution levels remain dangerously low and the distinction between process and result is crucial (Kay, 2003).

The study also makes the case that acknowledging regional actors' importance and impact in the EU policy cycle is not only consistent with the LI analytical framework but also an integral, if underappreciated, component of it. Regions, together with other non-state actors including a range of (usually economic) interest groups and stakeholders, co-determine national preferences since they constitute significant domestic players in an increasing number of member states (Kay, 2003). The need to explicitly include regions in the right-hand side of the "national preference formation" equation is shown by the increasing number of regions in the EU and their steady empowerment over the past three decades. From the pre-legislative through the post-legislative stages of the policy-making process, several European regions are actively and formally participating. It makes no sense to disregard the authority of regional governments in Austria, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Spain, or the United Kingdom. Continuing to ignore regions when analysing EU politics undermines LI's ability to make predictions and runs against its tenets. Since LI claims to be "open to conversation and synthesis with other

theories" (Leonard, 2013), this should urge users to give devolution's effects and the following role of regions in the EU policy-making process some serious thought. In this way, a bridge between LI and MLG may be successfully constructed.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Desktop research was used due to the noted and un-reviewed character of this research challenge. The relevance of urban communities' devolutions was gleaned from current literature and case studies. Secondary data was gathered from developed and developing countries' experiences, World Bank publications, Google Scholar articles, and previously presented studies on some of the important subjects of devolution, governance, development, and urbanisation.

RESULTS

Zimbabwe is a unitary state with two layers of sub-national government made up of 86 local councils, 10 provinces, and 10 metropolitan councils. In the new Constitution of 2013, provinces, which had previously only existed as administrative divisions, are included as a new level of government between the national and local levels (Leonard, 2013). Wards are used to further divide urban and rural governments for administrative purposes. Urban councils, which are made up of four local boards, eight town councils, ten municipal councils, and six city councils, are given varying status under the Urban Councils Act. Local boards are established in locations with relatively small populations or places that cannot maintain themselves without assistance from the central government. Town councils are big enough to operate on their own (Mhlanga, 2012). City councils, which have the greatest status in the country, are used to describe large cities.

Depending on the organisation's status, there are multiple election procedures for the executive. Local boards and town councils elect their chairpersons from among the council members, whilst municipal and city councils elect their mayors democratically every four years. Members of district councils are elected democratically in both urban and rural regions. The 2013 Constitution permits the creation of a new tier of political provinces. The Constitution gives province/metropolitan councils

more power and autonomy from the central government, and ten members of provincial councils, including their chairmen, are now democratically elected. Primary responsibilities of subnational governments (Mhlanga, 2015). The Constitution states that provincial and local governments are responsible for supporting economic development, coordinating and carrying out government projects, safeguarding the environment, promoting travel, etc. Despite having no separate budgetary allocation, provincial and local governments are nevertheless seen as parts of the Ministry of Local Government, Public Works, and National Housing. Urban councils have authority over a variety of things, including housing, transportation, schools, libraries, sanitation, environmental protection, fire brigades and municipal police, street lighting, public areas, parks, healthcare (hospitals, clinics, etc.), maternity and child welfare, housing, and water supply (Mhlanga, 2015). The construction and maintenance of sewage systems, roads, dams, and other infrastructure, as well as the provision of social services like health and education, are all responsibilities of rural district councils.

The lack of infrastructure development in Zimbabwe has an impact on the budgets and costs of local governments. So, as opposed to 85% of subnational spending for current purposes, just 14, 6% of subnational expenditures, or 0,4% of the national GDP, are allocated to capital expenditures (Mitchell, 2011). This is because municipal financing is noticeably lacking. The majority of local government organisations occasionally lack the funding necessary to support council operations, which restricts their ability to provide services. The main sources of financing for urban councils include property, trade account earnings, tariffs or fees for provided services, as well as grants for roads, health, and education. Additionally, public-private partnerships (PPPs) provide funding to the Harare City Council. Rural councils get funding from a variety of sources, including taxes on landowners, mining regions, licensed merchants, and permit holders.

Tax income is used by urban councils as a revenue source. The Rural District Councils Act states that the rural district councils' tax includes levies on landowners, mining sites, licensed traders, and licence holders.

Provinces are ineligible for their own taxes, grants, or subsidies since the Provincial Councils Act does not specifically state where the provinces would get their money from. Although in practice this proportion is not fulfilled, the Constitution requires that provincial and local governments get 5% of the national revenue (Mitchinson, 2003). The Constitution is silent on how these revenue transfers should be split between provincial/metropolitan councils and local governments. Transfers are divided between urban and rural locations. Local governments are helped through transfers for roads, health, and education. Certain payments are meant to cover regular expenditures in these businesses, such as wages, as well as the most fundamental administrative expenses. Local administrations rely heavily on levies, taxes, and licenses as a source of funding. According to the Urban Councils Act and the Rural District Councils Act, local governments can enact bylaws to raise money through charges charged for any services, amenities or facilities given by council (Mitchinson, 2003). These monies are obtained from several sources, including the licensing and registration of vehicles as well as the sale of water.

DISCUSSION

To carry out and advance regional economic planning and development within their own territories, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland each had their own independent development organisations prior to devolution. These functioned within the boundaries of UK national and regional policy (Mitchinson, 2003). Devolution was expected to lead to the development organisations continuing to change in various ways in response to the current and predicted economic conditions as well as the distinct requirements and objectives of the regional economies. The model was expanded. Regional development agencies were created in England, for instance, as a crucial component of the new Regional Assembly architecture, supplying crucial economic development delivery functions to the new legislative authorities. In general, it was envisaged that planning, supply of infrastructure, company growth and investment, and economic development would be more effectively integrated at the regional level (Morgan, 2001). This was viewed as a practical way of advancing the goals of national economic development and competitiveness, which were seen as crucial and essential justifications for

political decentralisation. We review and analyse the significant changes that have occurred in the institutions created across the UK since the late 1990s based on benchmarking exercises, academic research, and policy literature. We present and contrast the experiences of each nation and region with an understanding of their unique powers and resources.

Both literal and symbolic elements can be found in laws and regulations. Chapter 14 of Zimbabwe's new Constitution, when viewed from this angle, thereby offers the symbolic (as well as legal) articulation of the devolution framework (Morgan, 2001). It describes the three levels of government as outlined in the constitution, along with some of their duties and functions. The devolution legal framework's "concrete" aspect refers to both its actualisation and the realisation of its projected advantages (World Bank, 2015). Vernon Bogdanor compares devolution to a "mystery tour" because the process of translating symbolic devolution statutory articulations into actual implementation dimensions is rife with risks and limitations. In this section, the challenges of adopting devolution in Zimbabwe are covered. The new Zimbabwean administration, which took office following coordinated elections in July 2013, is presenting concrete political opportunity-based structures and limits that are the basis for this debate, in addition to a theoretical framework (Morgan, 2006). There are two types of constraints: official resources (laws, rules, and money) and informal resources (technical expertise, public opinion and the politics of political parties). First, there is a devolution proviso in the Constitution that permits one to start questioning the content, breadth, and depth of Zimbabwe's devolution legal framework in terms of the formal resources (i.e., law, regulations, and money). According to the Constitution, government functions and obligations shall be transferred, where necessary, to provincial and metropolitan councils and local authorities, which are competent to carry out such tasks efficiently and effectively (Morgan, 2006). This warning's political ramifications and message are obvious. Since the national government continues to be the highest tier of government, the Constitution gives it the authority to determine whether a particular province has the necessary skills to effectively manage local affairs and implement locally relevant socioeconomic development interventions for the benefit of the vast majority of the local population. The ZANU- PF government, which still

has oversight authority and power, will often control provincial, metropolitan, and municipal governments due to the vast legislative powers granted to the national government over these bodies (World Bank, 2015).

Second, there is evidence that the anti-devolutionist ZANU-PF-led government is determined to subvert and undermine the country's devolution of power constitutional provisions even before an Act of Parliament is drafted, debated, and enacted to provide appropriate legal powers, mechanisms, and procedures to facilitate coordination between the central government, provincial and metropolitan councils, and local authorities (Moyo, 2013). We say this because President Robert Mugabe chose ten ZANU-PF members to serve as Ministers of State for Provincial Affairs, with responsibility for each of the 10 provinces of Zimbabwe. There are worries that these Ministers of State for Provincial Affairs may successfully stifle the devolution of authority as a result of their nomination (Moyo, 2013). According to Trevor Maisiri of the International Crisis Group; hopes of power decentralisation have been crushed by the appointment of Ministers of State for Provincial Affairs. These provincial ministers will answer directly to the President; therefore, they will not have much involvement with local mayors or provincial councils. They will disregard any programme that is intended to be followed in their own provinces.

Furthermore, since the provinces will have provincial councils presided over by provincial council chairs, the selection of these Ministers would complicate the leadership hierarchy in the provinces. So who will lead a province's political and administrative operations? Is it the chairperson of the provincial council or the appropriate minister of state for provincial affairs? Local policymaking, service provision, and local development will be directly impacted by the anti-devolutionist ZANU-PF's opaque leadership structure (Okafor, 2016).

Thirdly, it is likely that Zimbabwe's new Act of Parliament to define devolution mechanisms and procedures will only grant administrative delegation of functions of the central government to [provincial and metropolitan councils] because ZANU-PF prefers a centralised unitary

state (as opposed to a devolved unitary state). The Act may be framed in terms of local involvement and autonomy, but neither is present. If this occurs, there is a risk that the ZANU-PF central government and its line ministries would reject or overturn several provincial councils' policy choices (Okafor, 2016). Therefore, it is likely that the central government would ram through policies that are, by law, the province's and the city's purview. Bogdanor (2015) has claimed that "a court to regulate the divide" between different tiers of a decentralised government is necessary for this reason. Therefore, issues that would need to be resolved include determining which government agency is primarily in charge of carrying out the devolution programme and who, in the event of a conflict between provincial and metropolitan councils and respective sector ministries, has the final say (Ribot, 2004). Spreading the authority for monitoring and adjudication across several important parties may have the benefit of preventing any one ministry or agency from seizing total control over the suggested sub-governments.

Fourth, the decentralised form of governance's financial structure would need to be carefully considered. The ability of provincial councils (provincial governments) to take charge of developing and enforcing policies in their jurisdictions may be severely hampered by a poor public spending allocation system or one that is not transparent, equitable, or accountable (Ribot, 2004). According to Morgan (2001), the distribution of public funds to sub-governments should be based on an analysis of regional needs rather than population for devolution to accomplish territorial justice. Narrowing regional gaps in Zimbabwe may continue to be an elusive goal because decentralisation does not entail discrimination against or preferential treatment of regions, as may be the case in a targeted regional economic policy (World Bank, 2015). This might strengthen claims that devolution is ineffective or possibly strengthen false notions of favouritism. Problematic would be the positive discrimination of sub-governments through the biased distribution of public funds to undeveloped areas like Matabeleland (Rondinelli, 2020). The paradox of devolution is that it would treat individuals as equals, negating the idea of territorial justice or equality. The best course of action would be to implement the maxim that "it is people, not places, who are poor" and design a transparent and equitable public expenditure allocation system

across provincial governments, with different provincial governments funding locally derived policy choices from revenue raised locally, such as local service rates and taxes.

Last but not least, following a decade of economic collapse and stagflation, Zimbabwe is presently experiencing an economic comeback. The threat of ongoing economic sanctions from nations like the United States, Australia, Canada, and the European Union, among others, implies that all three levels of government will face financial hardship, which will impede the prompt provision of public services soon (Rondinelli, 2020). This scenario will hinder the full devolution of power because provincial, metropolitan, and local governments will all be evaluated on how well or poorly they did at implementing devolution based on whether or not they developed locally relevant development policies and raised sufficient funds to do so for the benefit of local residents.

Technical know-how, public opinion, and political party politics are examples of informal resources that might limit Zimbabwe's implementation of devolution but are not necessarily related to the political institutions of a government ruled by the anti-devolutionist ZANU-PF party (even a pro-devolutionist Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) government would have faced the same informal constraints). Because of this, the debate presupposes that ZANU-PF will not modify the Constitution to overturn or undermine the devolutionary legal system. As a result, to improve the technical knowledge of staff members in all provincial and metropolitan councils concerning the creation and execution of policies, capacity development would be necessary (The Kenya Constitution, 2010). These sub-governments would need to equally develop their democratic institutions and political accountability frameworks. Where these institutions and processes are insufficient, Bardhan (2002) contends, elite groups may be able to control the provision of public services at all three levels of government, leading to decentralised authoritarianism and tyranny. To ensure that all residents, regardless of ethnicity or linguistic identity, have equal possibilities to achieve an "economic dividend" in whichever location they choose, continuing central government oversight would be necessary (World

Bank, 2015). Failure to control territorial provincial councils (provincial governments) that may support tribal nationalism directly or indirectly might erode national cohesion, making ZANU-PF's anti-devolution stance self-fulfilling. Therefore, province or metropolitan-based strategies must consider the whole national economic situation.

CONCLUSION

This paper has explored the prospects for and barriers to the devolution of power in Zimbabwe within the new constitutional framework introduced by the country's new 2013 Constitution. According to the argument, Zimbabwe's constitution's devolution of power provision marks a turning point in the country's governance, both in terms of the "economic dividend" that residents of "marginalised" provinces can expect from it and in terms of the deontological or normative ethical value of "self-government," which is "in" in today's discussions of citizen participation in good governance systems. Among the many formal and informal restrictions on devolution discussed, it is hypothesized that the main potential barrier to the creation of a fully devolved unitary Zimbabwe state will be a lack of or a low level of political will by a ZANU-PF dominated administration whose top officials have publicly stated their opposition to devolution. With a majority of more than two-thirds in both the Senate and Parliament, ZANU-PF has the option of maintaining the current state of a centralised form of government or passing a law with limited devolution of power through its legislative framework. In such cases, the subsequent provincial governments and local authorities won't be independent; instead, they'll just serve as managers and implementers of development programmes created by the national government, which may not be locally relevant. The anti-devolutionist ZANU-PF dominated administration in Zimbabwe and the character of Zimbabwean politics, therefore, point to a tumultuous and conflict-ridden political path toward devolution of power, whose full execution and anticipated advantages may take some time to materialise (if at all). In conclusion, it should be highlighted that while ZANU-PF politics is intrinsically predisposed toward centralisation, if the party moves forward with seriousness to completely execute devolution, this process may take a minimalist rather than a maximalist approach.

REFERENCES

- Bardhan, P. (2002). Decentralisation of Governance and Development. *The Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 16 (4), 185-191.
- Barnett, C. C., Minis, H. P. and Van Sant, J. (2017). Democratic Decentralization. Available at http://www.rti.org/pubs/Democr_Decen.PDF (accessed 1 December 2022).
- Bhebhe, N. (2013). President Mugabe 'Dumps' Devolution. Available at <http://www.southerneye.co.zw/2013/09/12/president-mugabe-dumps-devolution/> (accessed 1 October 2022).
- Blowgun, M. J. (2020). The Scope for Popular Participation in Decentralisation, Community Governance and Development: Towards a New Paradigm of Centre-periphery Relations. *Regional Development Dialogue*, 21 (1), 154.
- Bogdanor, V. (2018). "Devolution: Decentralisation or Disintegration. *The Political Quarterly*, 70 (2), 185-185.
- Bradbury, J. (2017). The Devolution Debate in Wales during the Major Governments: The Politics of a Developing Union State? *Regional and Federal Studies*, 8 (1), 120-132.
- Chikulo, B. C. (2018). Decentralisation and the Role of the State in the Future. In: Mandaza I. (ed.). *Governance and Human Development in Southern Africa: Selected Essays*. Harare: Southern Africa Printing and Publishing House. 81- 83.
- Government of Zimbabwe. (2013). *Constitution Amendment (No. 20) Act 2013*.
- Crawford, G. (2009). Making Democracy a reality? The Politics of Decentralisation and the Limits to Local Democracy in Ghana. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 27 (1), 57-593.
- Friedman, H. (2019). Local Political Alternatives for Decentralised Development. In: Cheema, G. S. & Rondinelli, D. A. (eds.). *Decentralisation and Development: Policy Implementation in Developing Countries*. London: SAGE Publications. 35.
- Government of Zambia. (2002). *The National Decentralisation Policy: Towards Empowering the People*. Lusaka: Office of the President.
- Harris, R. (2018). Centralisation and Decentralisation in Latin America. In Cheema, S & D. Rondinelli, D. (eds.). *Decentralisation Development: Policy Implementation in Developing Countries*. London: SAGE Publications, 183.

- Hooghe, L., & Marks, G. (2020). A post-functionalist theory of multilevel governance. *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 22 (4), 820-826.
- Ingham, B. & Kalam, A. K. M. (2019). Decentralisation and development: Theory and evidence from Bangladesh," *Public Administration and Development*, 12, 373-385.
- Juma, O. D. (2003). Devolution of Power: Building a Case for Local Government in the New Constitutional Order. *University of Nairobi Law Journal*, 12, 209-236.
- Kay, A. (2003). Evaluating devolution in Wales. *Political Studies*, 51 (1), p. 51- 66.
- Leonard, D. (2013). Inter-organizational Linkages for Decentralised Rural Development: Overcoming Administrative Weaknesses. In Cheema, G. S. & Rondinelli, D. A. (eds.) *Decentralisation and Development: Policy Implementation in Developing Countries*. London: SAGE Publications. 271.
- Leonardi R, Nanetti, R.Y & Putnam R.D. (2018). Devolution as a Political Process: The Case of Italy. *Publius: The Journal of Federalism*, 11 (1), 95- 97.
- Marinetto, M. (2001). The Settlement and Process of Devolution: Territorial Politics and Governance under the Welsh Assembly. *Political Studies*, 49 (2), 306-311.
- Mhlanga, B. (2012). Devolution - the 'Ticklish' Subject: the 'Northern Problem' and the National Question in Zimbabwe. *Ubuntu: Journal of Conflict Transformation*, 1 (1), 206 – 215
- Mhlanga, B. (2015). Zimbabwe's Post-colonial Antinomies as the 'Northern Problem': Policy Projections. *African Security Review*, 19 (4), 104-106.
- Mitchell, J. (2011). Rights and Devolution. Available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1916597&do_wnload=yes (accessed 1 January 2015).
- Mitchinson, R. (2003). Devolution in Uganda: An Experiment in Local Service Delivery. *Public Administration and Development*, 23 (3), 211-248.
- Morgan, K. (2001). The New Territorial Politics: Rivalry and Justice in Post-devolution Britain. *The Journal of Federalism* 36(1), 189-203.

- Morgan, K. (2006). Devolution and Development: Territorial Justice and the North-south divide. *The Journal of Federalism*, 36, (1), 189-203.
- Moyo, P. (2013). The Devolution of Power Debate and the Zimbabwe National Project. In Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S.J & Ndhlovu, F (eds.). *Nationalism and National Projects in Southern Africa: New Critical Reflections*. Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa, 140.
- Okafor, F. (2016). Community Involvement in Rural Development: A Field Study in the Bendel State of Nigeria. *Community Development Journal*, 17 (2), 134-137.
- Ribot, J. (2004). *Waiting for Democracy: The Politics of Choice in Natural Resource Decentralisation*. Washington DC: World Resources Institute 2004.
- Rondinelli, D. A. (1981). Administrative Decentralisation and Economic Development: The Sudan's Experiment with Devolution. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 19 (4), 595-624.
- Rondinelli, D, A. and Nellis, J. R. (1986). Assessing Decentralisation Policies in Developing Countries: The Case for Cautious Optimism. *Development Policy Review*, 4(1), 3-23.
- Tatham, M. (2007). Scotland and the European Union: Has Devolution Changed Anything? In Leydier, G. (ed.). *Scotland and Europe: Scotland in Europe*. Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.214-229.
- Tatham, M. (2010). With or Without you? Revisiting Territorial State-bypassing in EU Interest Representation. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 17 (1), 76-99.
- The Kenya Constitution. (2010).
- World Bank, (2015). Decentralisation and Sub-national Regional Economics. (2001). Available at <http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/decentralisation/what.htm> (accessed 1 January 2023);